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Reconciling Student Due Process Rights in Sexual Misconduct Adjudications: What Educational
Institutions and Policymakers can Learn from Haidak
Lauren McNamara*

I. Introduction
In November 2018, the United States Department of Education (“DOE”) released a set of
Title IX regulations aimed at reforming how public universities conduct Title IX procedures. 1 The
proposed regulations (“2018 regulations”) endeavored to improve how universities address
allegations of sexual assault and sexual harassment by requiring procedural due process
protections, such as live hearings and cross-examination procedures.2 The 2018 regulations
mirrored the Sixth Circuit’s 2018 holding in Doe v. Baum.3 In Baum, the court held that public
universities must provide an accused student or the accused student’s representative with the
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and adverse witnesses. 4 This procedural shift
incited significant controversy, as critics argued that universities would now resemble a “quasilegal system” that would burden universities and ultimately, harm students.5
Amidst this controversy, in Haidak v. University of Massachusetts-Amherst the First
Circuit departed from the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule in Baum, holding that the crossexamination of a complainant and adverse witnesses by a neutral third party satisfies student due
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1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos: Proposed Title IX Rule Provides Clarity for Schools, Support
for Survivors, and Due Process Rights for All (Nov. 16, 2018) (on file with U.S. Dep’t of Educ.) (hereinafter 2018
Press Release).
2 Id.
3 Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018).
4 Id.
5 See Andrew Kreighbaum, College Groups Blast DeVos Title IX Proposal, I NSIDE H IGHER ED (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/31/higher-ed-groups-call-major-changes-devos-title-ix-rule.
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process rights in Title IX matters relating to sexual misconduct.6 Baum and Haidak’s conflicting
holdings present a new lens for analyzing student due process rights in Title IX grievance
procedures, particularly in sexual misconduct matters. Further, in reconciling the two cases the
First Circuit’s holding presents a workable solution that should inform how universities and
policymakers address student due process rights in Title IX sexual misconduct matters. The 2018
regulations are still being finalized and it is unknown when they will be released. 7 Regardless of
the DOE’s finalized Title IX regulations, litigation in this area will continue to be a subject of
intense scrutiny and university policies will need to continually adapt. The Haidak holding offers
important guidance as universities and policymakers determine how to fairly balance a student’s
right to be heard and a student’s right to an education free from sexual assault and harassment.
This Comment is intended to assist universities, legal advisors, educational institutions,
and policymakers in navigating current confusion surrounding due process rights in Title IX sexual
misconduct matters, specifically procedural due process requirements for university proceedings
or hearings. Part II of this Comment will provide a brief history of Title IX regulations and how
Title IX regulations have evolved to address sexual misconduct at public universities. Part II will
further explain student due process rights through an explanation of key case law and conclude by
describing the current tension between Title IX regulations and student due process right s. Part
III will analyze the conflicting holdings in Baum and Haidak. Part IV will argue that the First
Circuit’s holding in Haidak, through its analysis of a university’s cross-examination procedures in

6

Haidak v. Univ. of Massachusetts-Amherst, No. 18-1248, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 23482 (1st Cir. Aug. 6, 2019).
See Sarah Brown and Katherine Mangan, What You Need to Know about the Proposed Title IX Regulations, THE
CHRON. OF H IGHER ED. (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/What-You-Need-to-KnowAbout/245118; Christopher Carusone and Kate Emert Gleason, Correspondence Encourages the DOE Not to
Release New Title IX Regulations Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic, JD SUPRA (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/correspondence-encourages-the-doe-not-18201/.
7
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a sexual misconduct matter, presents a workable solution to current concerns regarding student
due process rights in Title IX sexual misconduct matters. Part V will briefly conclude.

II. The Evolution of Title IX Regulations and Student Due Process Rights in Sexual Misconduct
Matters
This Section will first provide background on Title IX regulations and how the regulations
address sexual misconduct. Second, this Section will explain key case law regarding student due
process rights. Finally, this Section will conclude by addressing the relationship between Title IX
regulations and student due process rights.
A. Background on Title IX Regulations Regarding Matters of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment
The U.S. Congress passed Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 on June 23,
1972.8 Congress passed Title IX in response to the educational inequality experienced by women
prior to the 1970s.9 Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex in education programs
and activities operated by recipients of federal financial assistance.”10 Schools are responsible for
“taking steps to prevent sex-based discrimination, including sexual harassment, and for responding
quickly and effectively to harassment when it occurs.” 11
Focusing on Title IX’s regulations pertaining to sexual assault and harassment, the United
States Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued further guidance in 1997.12 The guidance, titled
“Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Others Students,

U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION, EQUAL ACCESS TO EDUCATION: FORTY YEARS OF TITLE IX (2012).
Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR C IVIL R IGHTS, SEXUAL H ARASSMENT GUIDANCE : H ARASSMENT OF
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (1997).
8
9

4

or Third Parties,” emphasized legal authority which established the sexual harassment of students
as a form of sex discrimination covered by Title IX. 13 Under this guidance, teachers and
administrators must recognize instances of sexual harassment, take prompt action to end the
harassment, and prevent it from reoccurring.14 The OCR’s guidance underscored that schools
retained flexibility in designing procedures for responding to sexual misconduct as long as those
procedures were reasonable and similar to how the school would respond to other types of serious
misconduct.15
Subsequent Supreme Court cases confirmed the duty of schools to effectively address
sexual harassment and sexual misconduct by both students and teachers in order to create a safe
school environment.16 Following these Supreme Court cases, in 2001 the OCR published revised
guidance for schools that provided information and examples to assist schools in determining if
sexual harassment occurred.17 Further, the OCR attempted to clarify how a school’s response to
sexual misconduct allegations would be evaluated under Title IX regulations.18 Specifically, the
OCR emphasized that a school’s response to allegations of sexual misconduct would be measured
by a “reasonableness” standard in which “[s]chools do not have to know beforehand that their
response will be effective. However, if their initial steps are ineffective in stopping the harassment,
reasonableness may require a series of escalating steps.” 19 The OCR also recognized the due
process rights of individuals by stating that schools must recognize due process rights “consistent

13

Id.
Id.
15 Id.
16 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629
(1999).
17 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR C IVIL R IGHTS, R EVISED SEXUAL H ARASSMENT GUIDANCE:
H ARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (2001) (hereinafter 2001
Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance).
18 Id.
19 Id.
14
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with any federally guaranteed due process rights involved in a complaint proceeding” but that
schools “should ensure that steps to accord due process rights do not restrict or unnecessarily delay
the protections provided by Title IX to the complainant.” 20
Schools were also required to adopt and publish a policy outlining grievance procedures
for sex discrimination and sexual misconduct. 21 These grievance procedures had to be “prompt
and equitable” and provide an “effective measure for preventing and responding to sexual
harassment.”22 In evaluating whether a school’s response to sexual harassment was “prompt and
equitable” the OCR would consider:
(1) notice to students, parties, and employees of the grievance procedure; (2)
application of the procedure to complaints alleging harassment; (3) adequate,
reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity to
present witnesses and other evidence; (4) clear timelines for the major stages of the
complaint process; (5) notice to parties of the outcome of the complaint; and (6) an
assurance that the school will take steps to prevent a reoccurrence of the
harassment.23
Later, in 2011, the OCR issued a “Dear Colleague Letter” (“DCL”) that supplemented its
2001 guidance.24 The OCR emphasized that the DCL was intended to provide further guidance
regarding how the DOE would evaluate a school’s compliance with its legal obligations under
Title IX.25 Importantly, the DCL required schools to use a preponderance of evidence standard (it
is more likely than not that sexual harassment or violence occurred) when responding to allegations
of sexual misconduct.26 At the time, some schools followed a “clear and convincing” evidence
standard (highly probable or reasonably certain that the sexual harassment or violence occurred).27

20

See 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 17.
Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 4,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf (hereinafter Dear College Letter).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
21

2011),
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The DCL stated that the “clear and convincing” standard was inconsistent and not equitable under
Title IX.28
The DCL also outlined how schools should facilitate sexual misconduct proceedings, in
particular, hearings.29 The guidance explained that parties must be provided an equal opportunity
to present relevant witnesses and evidence through a hearing or another mechanism. 30 The DCL
opposed allowing parties to personally question or cross-examine each other because such
procedures “may be traumatic…possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment” that the
hearing sought to remedy.31 Additionally, schools were encouraged to establish an appeals
process.32
On September 22, 2017, the DOE withdrew the 2011 DCL, as well as a 2014 OCR
document titled “Questions and Answers on Title XI and Sexual Violence,” because the guidance
“led to the deprivation of rights for many students—both accused students denied fair process and
victims denied an adequate resolution of their complaints.” 33 Specifically, the DOE claimed that
the 2011 and 2014 guidance did not adhere to fundamental standards of fairness because both
adopted a minimal standard of proof (the preponderance of the evidence standard), discouraged
cross-examination by the parties, and prioritized the efficient resolution of Title IX complaints
over affording parties due process protections. 34 Instead, the DOE directed schools to follow its
2001 guidance until final regulations were released under Secretary of Education, Betsy Devos.35

28

See Dear College Letter, supra note 24.
Id.
30 Id.
31 Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
29

7

The DOE’s 2001 guidance required “prompt and equitable” grievance procedures that included
adequate notice to students as well as the opportunity to present witnesses and other evidence. 36
B. Student Due Process Rights
Public institutions must adhere to Title IX requirements in order to receive federal funding,
but also must consider due process rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. 37 Importantly,
due process requirements only apply at public universities, while Title IX and DOE regulations
apply to all universities.38 When courts analyze a question of due process rights, the analysis
typically proceeds in a two-step manner.39 First, the court evaluates whether due process applies
(whether a person’s life, liberty, or property is being put at risk because of something the
government is doing).40 Second, if the person is entitled to due process, the court determines what
process is due under the specific circumstances. 41 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court
held that the process that is due depends largely on context and three factors: (1) what is at stake
for the person; (2) how risky it is under the current procedures for the person to be wrongly
punished and how likely is it that safeguards would reduce that risk; and (3) how costly and time
consuming the new protections would be for the government.42
The Supreme Court followed the Mathews framework in its first major holding on students’
due process rights in Goss v. Lopez.43 In Goss, students who faced short suspensions brought a
class action against school officials, contending that due process required hearings prior to the

36

See 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 17.
FIRE’s Guide to Due Process and Campus Justice, FOUND. FOR I NDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Dec. 13, 2013),
https://www.thefire.org/research/publications/fire-guides/fires-guide-to-due-process-and-campus-justice/fires-guideto-due-process-and-fair-procedure-on-campus-full-text/ [bereinafter FIRE’s Guide].
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
43 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
37
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enactment of a suspension.44 The Court reasoned that public education was a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause45 and that a student’s liberty is at stake when the student’s
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is being questioned.46 Further, the Court articulated that
the “fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard,” and students were
entitled to “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing.” 47
The Court considered the costs schools would face if student disciplinary procedures
followed common law trials and required that “there be at least an informal give-and-take between
student and disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension.” 48 Therefore, in the context of a
short suspension, under Goss, schools are not required to facilitate the production of evidence, the
opportunity for cross-examination, legal representation for the parties, or an appeal procedure.49
The Court did note that due process “may require more formal procedures” in more serious cases.50
Since Goss, lower federal courts and various state courts have grappled on a case-by-case
basis with the issue of when more “formal procedures” may apply to school disciplinary
proceedings.51 There have been no higher court decisions to clarify the types of procedures
necessary.52 According to the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, the “principle firmly
established by these federal and state courts is that the amount of due process required in campus
disciplinary cases must be based on the particular nature and gravity of the charges and
circumstances.”53 Case law suggests that courts are hesitant to second -guess the disciplinary

44

Id. at 568.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 579.
48 Id. at 584.
49 Id. at 583.
50 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
51 FIRE’s Guide, supra note 37.
52 Id.
53 Id.
45
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decisions made by education institutions.54 Further, due process is intended to be flexible and the
“establishment of a one-size-fits-all rules would be contrary to the constitutional premise that one
has a right only to the process that is ‘due.’”55
C. The Relationship Between Title IX Regulations and Student Due Process Rights
The relationship between Title IX regulations and student due process rights is complicated
and controversial, especially in sexual misconduct matters. 56 Despite the relative flexibility
schools have in developing procedural protections for student due process rights, many criticized
and continue to criticize the 2011 DCL as a serious threat to student due process rights. 57 For
example, in 2016, the American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) wrote a report
that raised significant concerns about the implications of the 2011 DCL.58 The AAUP’s concerns
included: (1) whether education institutions are the right forum to hear sexual assault cases; (2)
whether altering the evidence standard to a “preponderance of evidence” deprives the accused of
a fair hearing; and (3) whether a mandated procedure that negates the right to cross-examine one’s
accuser violates due process.59
The controversy surrounding the 2011 DCL letter prompted the DOE to withdraw the 2011
DCL in 2017 and in 2018, propose a revised set of Title IX regulations.60 The DOE stated that its
2018

regulations would improve university responses to sexual assault and harassment by

See Fern L. Kletter, Schools Violation of Student’s Substantive Due Process Rights by Suspension or Expelling
Student, 90 A.L.R. 235 (2013).
55 FIRE’s Guide, supra note 37.
56 See Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Title IX Office of Civil Rights Directives: An Assault Against Due Process and
First Amendment Rights, 23 J. OF LAW, BUS. & ETHICS 1 (2017).
57 Id.
58 The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title IX, AM. ASSOC. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS (June 2016),
https://www.aaup.org/report/history-uses-and-abuses-title-ix.
59 Id.
60 See Proposed Amendments to Title IX Education Amendments of 1972, 34 C.F.R. Part 106 (proposed Nov. 29,
2018).
54

10

ensuring transparency and consistency in Title IX grievance proceedings. 61 The DOE explained
that one means of increasing transparency and consistency in Title IX grievance proceedings
would be through due process protections for students in the form of live hearings and new crossexamination procedures that would be conducted by the complainant’s and respondent’s advisor
of choice.62
The 2018 regulations were highly scrutinized.63 Between the release of the regulations in
November 2018, and the DOE’s public comment period ending in February 2019, over 100,000
comments were filed.64 Some were concerned that the 2018 regulations relied too heavily on
formal legal procedures and concepts not appropriate or feasible in an educational setting. 65 Others
argued that the 2018 regulations were too concerned with protecting the accused. 66 In contrast,
advocates for individual rights in education and other organizations, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), ultimately praised the DOE’s focus on student due process rights and
shift to live hearings with cross-examination procedures.67
While universities, key advocacy groups, and policymakers grappled (and continue to grapple)
with the relationship between student due process rights and Title IX protections in light of the

61

2018 Press Release, supra note 1.
Id.
63 See Hallie Busta, Ed. Dept.’s Title IX Proposal Gets 100k Public Comments, EDUCATIONDIVE (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.educationdive.com/news/ed-depts-title-ix-proposal-gets-100k-public-comments/547414/.
64 Id. (stating that the proposed Title IX “rewrite” is “the most controversial regulatory undertaking” in the DOE’s
history).
65 Letter from the American Council on Education, to Betsy DeVos, Secretary of the Department of Education (Jan.
30, 2019) (on file with author) (stating that “[c]olleges and universities are not law enforcement agencies or courts,”
and that the proposed regulations rely “on formal legal procedures and concepts” that are “wildly inappropriate and
infeasible in an educational setting”) [hereinafter American Council on Education Letter].
66 See Laura Meckler, Devos Set to Bolster Rights of Accused in Title IX Cases, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://beta.washingtonpost.com/local/education/betsy-devos-set-to-bolster-rights-of-accused-in-rewrite-of-sexualassault-rules/2018/11/14/828ebd9c-e7d1-11e8-a939-9469f1166f9d_story.html; Erica L. Green, Sex Assault Rules
Under DeVos Bolster Defandants' Rights and Ease College Liability, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/politics/betsy-devos-title-ix.html.
67 See American Council on Education Letter, supra note 65 (“While the ACLU supports live hearings and crossexamination in the university context, it believes the cross-examination right would be substantially improved
if…modified in several respects to further ensure equity and to prevent abuse.”).
62
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DOE’s 2018 changes, two circuits delivered important and conflicting opinions that offer key
insight into the debate.
III. The Conflicting Holdings of Baum and Haidak
This Section will analyze the conflicting holdings of Baum and Haidak. It will provide
factual background on both cases, highlight the key reasoning of both opinions, and explain how
each decision was received.
A. Factual Background on the Baum Decision
In Baum, John Doe and Jane Roe were students at the University of Michigan attending a
fraternity party.68 At the party, Doe and Roe drank alcohol, danced, and had sexual intercourse.69
Two days later, Roe filed a sexual misconduct complaint claiming that she was too intoxicated to
consent to sexual intercourse.70 Having sexual intercourse with an incapacitated person violated
the university’s policies, and consequently, the university launched an investigation. 71

The

school’s investigator collected evidence and interviewed Doe and Roe, as well as twenty-three
other witnesses.72
The investigator concluded that the relevant question, whether Roe was too intoxicated to
consent during the encounter, could not be addressed based on the evidence and recommended
that the administration rule in Doe’s favor.73 Roe appealed the decision and a three-member panel
reviewed the investigator’s report.74 After two closed sessions (no new evidence was introduced

68

Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
Id.
70 Id. at 579.
71 Id. at 578.
72 Id.
73 Baum, 903 F.3d at 580.
74 Id.
69
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nor were students interviewed), the panel reversed the decision.75

The panel found Roe’s

description of events “more credible” and Roe’s witnesses “more persuasive.”76 Facing the
possibility of expulsion, Doe agreed to withdraw from the university. 77
Doe subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming that the university’s disciplinary proceedings
violated the Due Process Clause and Title IX.78 Doe argued that because the university’s decision
turned on a credibility finding, the school was required to give him a hearing with an opportunity
to cross-examine Roe and adverse witnesses.79 The university filed a motion to dismiss, which
the district court granted and Doe appealed.80
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Opinion and Reasoning
In evaluating Doe’s appeal, the court first emphasized that the “opportunity to be heard” is
the “Constitutional minimum.”81 The court noted that determining what “being heard” looks like
requires a balancing of the parties’ competing interests, citing the Mathews and Goss opinions.82
The court turned to its own decisions, outlining that in the context of universities, if a student is
accused of misconduct, the university must hold some sort of hearing before imposing a serious
sanction like expulsion or suspension.83 Similarly, when the university’s determination turns on
the credibility of the accuser, the accused, or witnesses, the hearing must include an opportunity
for cross-examination.84 The court described cross-examination as the “greatest legal engine” for

75

Id.
Id.
77 Id. at 578.
78 Baum, 903 F.3d at 578.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 581.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Baum, 903 F.3d at 581.
76
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“uncovering the truth,” and consequently, if a university’s decision turns on credibility, the hearing
must include an opportunity for cross-examination in order to satisfy due process. 85
Because Doe never received an opportunity to cross-examine Roe or adverse witnesses,
the court reasoned that there was a serious risk that the university “erroneously deprived Doe of
his protected interests.”86 The court continued to emphasize the importance of cross-examination
in credibility determinations and noted that it would be feasible for the university to facilitate crossexamination procedures.87 The court stated that Doe’s interests were also significant, as being
labeled a sex offender carries severe consequences, and therefore, Doe was entitled to respond to
his accuser’s allegations.88
The court was not persuaded by the university’s argument that Doe was “heard” because
he was permitted to review Roe’s statement and submit a response identifying inconsistencies and
therefore, there would have been “no added benefit to cross-examination.”89 The court explained,
“[w]ithout the back-and-forth of adversarial questioning, the accused cannot probe the witness’s
story to test her memory, intelligence, or potential ulterior motives. Nor can the fact-finder observe
the witness’s demeanor under that questioning.”90 The court did, however, explain that the accused
may not always have a right to personally confront his or her accuser. 91 The court articulated that
universities have a legitimate interest in avoiding procedures that subject an alleged victim to
further harm or harassment, and allowing the accused to cross-examine his or her accuser could

85

Id.
Id. at 582.
87 Baum, 903 F.3d at 582.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 583.
86
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cause such harm.92 The court proposed that instead of denying cross-examination, universities
could allow the accused’s agent to conduct cross-examination.93
C. Responses to the Baum Decision
The Baum decision was significant because it was the second decision in which the Sixth
Circuit ruled that students facing sexual misconduct charges at university disciplinary hearings
were entitled to cross-examine their accusers.94 Previously, in Doe v. University of Cincinnati, the
Sixth Circuit held that a university student facing allegations of sexual assault is permitted to
confront his or her accuser at a disciplinary hearing. 95 Therefore, within the Sixth Circuit, college
administrators who deny students the right of cross-examination in future disciplinary proceedings
can be held personally liable for violating a “well-established constitutional right.”96
Critics highlighted that the decision left “open” who would conduct such crossexaminations and how they would be conducted.97 Further, critics noted that the decision failed
to define the scope of the required hearing or adversarial proceeding, as prior case law
demonstrates that a “full-scale” adversarial hearing for school disciplinary proceedings is not

92

Baum, 903 F.3d at 583.
Id.
94 Richard Fossey and Todd A. DeMitchell, Doe v. Baum: The Sixth Circuit Reiterates that Students Accused of
Sexual Assault Are Constitutionally Entitled to Confront their Accusers at University Title IX Disciplinary Hearings,
SCHOOL LAW REP. (Dec. 2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329512251_Doe_v_Baum_The_Sixth_Circuit_Reiterates_that_Students_
Accused_of_Sexual_Assault_are_Constitutionally_Entitled_to_Confront_Their_Accusers_at_University_Title_IX_
Disciplinary_Hearings.
95 Richard Fossey and Todd A. DeMitchell, Doe v. Baum: The Sixth Circuit Reiterates that Students Accused of
Sexual Assault Are Constitutionally Entitled to Confront their Accusers at University Title IX Disciplinary Hearings,
SCHOOL LAW REP. (Dec. 2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329512251_Doe_v_Baum_The_Sixth_Circuit_Reiterates_that_Students_
Accused_of_Sexual_Assault_are_Constitutionally_Entitled_to_Confront_Their_Accusers_at_University_Title_IX_
Disciplinary_Hearings.
96 Id. See Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, A Potential Title IX Supreme Court Case?, I NSIDE H IGHER ED (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/08/ruling-umass-amherst-title-ix-lawsuit-may-lead-supreme-courtcase-experts-say (“Experts in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972…heralded the opinion as a
reformation of due process in such cases, at least among the collection of Midwestern states the Sixth Circuit
encompasses. The Sixth Circuit is becoming known for producing more radical opinions in Title IX cases that have
made waves among lawyers and college administrators.”).
97 Id.
93
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required to satisfy due process.98 After the Baum decision, legal advisors warned that education
institutions that did not provide hearings or cross-examination for sexual misconduct matters faced
a “heightened risk of adverse findings in due process and Title IX erroneous outcome claims.”99
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit’s ruling appeared consistent with the DOE’s increased focus
on due process protections in its 2018 regulations. 100 Because of this, legal advisors warned that
universities should not consider the Baum decision an “outlier, but rather as consistent with the
national trend toward requiring additional due process in Title IX proceedings.” 101 Further, legal
experts noted that the Baum decision affects Title IX practices at more than forty state colleges and
universities in Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and the decision would likely influence
other courts considering similar cases.102
Additionally, many policymakers argued that the opinion was overly concerned with the
rights of accused students.103 Critics emphasized that adversarial questioning might discourage
victims of sexual assault and sexual harassment from coming forward and would also discourage
witnesses from testifying on behalf of accusers. 104 Essentially, the decision was “framed as a
victory for the accused in cases of sexual assault.”105
D. Factual Background on the Haidak Decision

98

Id.
Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. See Editorial Board, Due Process for Sexual Assault Cases; The Sixth Circuit Says the Accused have a Right
to Cross-Examination, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2103234858/citation/2D68495DA2A4382PQ/1?accountid=13793 (“The ruling
also adds legal credence to Education Secretary Besty DeVos's effort to restore due process in Title IX proceedings.
Michigan hasn't said if it will a ppeal, but the Supreme Court is overdue for a case on how universities adjudicate
sexual assault.”).
102 Editorial Board, Due Process for Sexual Assault Cases; The Sixth Circuit Says the Accused have a Right to
Cross-Examination, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 13, 2018).
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2103234858/citation/2D68495DA2A4382PQ/1?accountid=1379 3.
103 Michigan Daily Editorial Board, From the Daily: The Problems of Cross-Examination, M ICHIGAN DAILY (Sept.
16, 2018), https://www.michigandaily.com/section/editorials/daily-problems-cross-examination.
104 Id.
105 Id.
99
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After Baum, the First Circuit issued an opinion considering the same issue.106 In Haidak,
James Haidak and Lauren Gibney were students at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst
who had been in a tumultuous relationship since 2012.107 When studying abroad in Barcelona,
Haidak and Gibney engaged in an argument that turned physical.108 According to Gibney, Haidak
put his hand around her neck, pushed her onto the bed, hurt her by squeezing various pressure
points, and grabbed her wrists and punched himself in the face with her fists. 109 Later that day,
Gibney’s mother called the university to report that Haidak had physically assaulted Gibney.110
Gibney followed up three days later by submitting a written report of the incident. 111 The
university initiated an investigation.112
The university gave Haidak notice of Gibney’s allegations and issued a no-contact order.
Haidak denied the allegations, and both parties resumed contact with each other. 113 Later, Haidak
and Gibney had an argument when Haidak arrived a bar where Gibney worked and positioned
himself uncomfortably close to Gibney until security removed him. 114 Subsequently, Gibney
obtained a restraining order against Haidak.115 The university offered Haidak a date for a hearing
and sent a handout describing hearing procedures.116 The procedures allowed for Haidak to submit
questions for the Board to consider when questioning the complainant and witnesses. 117 Haidak
submitted thirty-six questions, which the Assistant Dean of Students, Patricia Cardoso, pared down
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to sixteen.118 Haidak and Cardoso discussed the evidence that Haidak wished to present to the
hearing board.119
During the hearing, four students and one staff member considered Haidak’s charges.120
Gibney attended in person, while Haidak phoned in and Haidak’s attorney observed.121 Two
university advisors were also appointed to both Haidak and Gibney, and both were present at the
hearing.122 The hearing board asked questions to both Haidak and Gibney, examining each student
three times.123 Of the questions the board asked Gibney, none were worded identically to those
proposed by Haidak, but were designed to elicit the same information. 124 Ultimately, the board
found that Haidak’s behavior was “disproportionate to the actions he attributed to Gibney” and
that Haidak caused physical harm to Gibney based on the “narratives and pictures presented
in the hearing.”125
After reviewing the board’s finding and Haidak’s disciplinary history (which included two
prior violations of the university’s student code of conduct), the Associate Dean of Students, David
Vaillancourt, decided expulsion was necessary. 126 Haidak appealed and the university’s appeals
board recommended that Vaillancourt’s sanction be upheld. 127 Haidak then filed a two-count
complaint against the university and the officials involved, alleging due process, equal protection,
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and Title IX violations.128

The district court dismissed Haidak’s procedural due process

challenges.129
E. The First Circuit’s Opinion and Reasoning
The First Circuit articulated that it was not evaluating whether Haidak’s hearing mirrored
a common law trial, but whether Haidak had an “opportunity to answer, explain, and defend.”130
Haidak argued that due process requires the accused or the accused’s representative to question
opposing witnesses directly whenever a disciplinary proceeding turns on the witnesses’
credibility.131 The court noted that the university did not implement an adversarial model in its
truth-seeking, but rather, an inquisitorial model. 132 The court explained, contrary to Haidak’s
argument, that the inquisitorial model is not considered inadequate in all settings, noting that the
inquisitorial model of truth-seeking is often used in critical administrative decisions, such as
whether to award or terminate disability benefits. 133
Further, the court emphasized that students do not have a right to legal counsel in school
disciplinary hearings, which Haidak did not allege, and therefore, the court explained Haidak’s
position “would seem to be that the accused student must be allowed to question opposing
witnesses himself.”134 Here, the court noted that “schools may reasonably fear that studentconducted cross-examination will lead to displays of acrimony or worse.” 135 The court referenced
guidance from the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, which recommends that in
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sexual misconduct matters, or any matter that turns on credibility, there is some opportunity for
“real-time” cross-examination and that a “hearing panel is sufficient.”136
In considering the holding in Baum, the court agreed with the Sixth Circuit and found the
“complete absence of any examination before the factfinder is procedurally deficient.”137
However, the court emphasized that the Sixth Circuit took “the conclusion one step further than
we care to go, announcing a categorical rule that the state school had to provide for crossexamination by the accused or his representative in all cases turning on credibility. . . .”138 The
court found that questioning a complaining witness by a neutral party is not so “. . . fundamentally
flawed as to create a categorically unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation” and that “student
disciplinary proceedings need not mirror common law trials.”139 Further, the First Circuit noted
the possibility for a “slippery slope” of universities holding jury trials in implementing the Baum
holding.140
After determining that the questioning model utilized by the university, where a panel
conducted multiple rounds of questioning of parties and witnesses, was constitutionally sufficient,
the court evaluated whether the school conducted “reasonably adequate questioning.” 141 The court
found that in Haidak’s case, this was a “close question.” 142 After reviewing the school’s manual
and directions for its hearing board and evaluating Haidak’s actual hearing,143 the court found that
both Haidak and Gibney were questioned in real-time, and both parties, particularly Gibney, were
asked three times to further clarify and restate responses to ensure consistency. 144 As part of its
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analysis, the court also looked to the “probative value” of the hearing board’s questions and held
that the board conducted a hearing that was reasonably calculated to get to the truth by allowing
Haidak to be heard after Gibney testified and examining Gibney in a “manner reasonably
calculated to expose any relevant flaws in her claims.” 145
F. Responses to the Haidak Decision
The decision generated mixed responses regarding its departure from the Baum holding.146
Some responses have highlighted that the First Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit that crossexamination should be mandated in some form in sexual misconduct hearings at universities, and
thus, the split may be one of degree.147 Other sources noted that the circuit spilt will create
confusion and complexity for universities as case law differs and regulations are in “flux.”148
Consequently, litigation will inevitably arise. 149 Finally, experts explained that while the split is
“dramatic,” until other cases work through court systems across the country, universities will not
know whether the Sixth Circuit opinion is more of an outlier or the standard. 150 Colleges and
universities have largely followed a model similar to the one the First Circuit endorsed in Haidak,
as under current DOE regulations there is ambiguity over how a hearing or proceeding should be
structured (an ambiguity the 2018 proposed regulations seek to clarify by requiring live hearings
and cross-examination).151
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As for the Haidak decision, many questioned what the court meant by “reasonably
calculated” questioning and criticized the ruling as unclear. 152 One expert explained that because
the “reasonably calculated” standard is ambiguous, it is likely that the decision will lead to “a lot
of litigation over whether the school-conducted questioning in any given case was sufficient.” 153
Essentially, as universities wait for the 2018 regulations to be finalized, the contentious opinions
in Baum and Haidak have created additional complexity and confusion for Title IX administrators.
IV. The Haidak Opinion: A Fair Process for Sexual Misconduct Adjudications
This Section will first argue that the Haidak decision meets procedural due process
standards because the Constitution does not require university disciplinary proceedings to be
modeled after common law trials and include procedural due process protections such as live crossexamination. Next, it will outline the ways in which the Haidak decision mitigates current tension
around facilitating fair sexual misconduct proceedings as well as recognizes a university’s interest
in maintaining consistent, feasible procedures and most importantly, protecting victims of sexual
assault and harassment.
A. The Haidak Decision Meets Procedural Due Process Standards Under the Constitution
In evaluating the due process procedures required in a non-criminal matter, such as
university disciplinary proceedings, courts follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge. In Mathews, the Supreme Court held that the process that is due depends largely on
context and three factors: (1) what is at stake for the person; (2) how risky it is under the current
procedures for the person to be wrongly punished and how likely is it that safeguards would reduce

152
153

Id.
Id.

22

that risk; and (3) how costly and time consuming the new protections would be for the
government.154
The Mathews framework is recognized as the “universal analysis federal courts use when
determining the extent and the type of notice, and what additional procedural requirements apply
in different situations.”155 Courts have applied the Mathews framework in a variety of contexts to
determine what kind of due process is required.156 For example, in Cleveland Board of Education
v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court found that due process required a school board to provide a
“limited pre-termination hearing” before the discharge of an employee followed by a “posttermination” hearing in which an employee could challenge the discharge.157 Further, the Court
has applied the Mathews framework in claims regarding government benefits and services,158
family rights matters,159

children’s rights matters,160 prisoners’ rights matters,161 creditors’

claims,162 and forfeiture proceedings.163 Essentially, the Mathews framework recognizes that
notice and the opportunity to be heard can be satisfied “with less detailed and less formal
proceedings than in the criminal context” and there is not a categorical rule that governs every
situation.164 This is particularly true in the school discipline context.
In school discipline matters, following the Mathews analysis, the Supreme Court has found
that schools are not “a courtroom”165 and like other non-criminal matters, procedural due process
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may involve less detailed and formal procedures. The Supreme Court followed the Mathews
framework in its first major holding on students’ due process rights in Goss v. Lopez.166 The
Court’s holding in Goss emphasized that a school is not required to model its disciplinary
proceedings after common law trials.167 For example, students do not have a right to legal counsel
and due process procedures are subject to university discretion. 168 The Goss opinion does,
however, require that schools provide accused students with notice and “some kind of hearing.”169
The Court noted that more “formal” procedures might be required for more serious disciplinary
cases, but did not clarify what more “formal” procedures would be required, or the types of
“serious” cases that would warrant them.170 Despite the serious nature of sexual misconduct
allegations, Title IX regulations have historically recognized the Goss holding as granting
universities flexibility in designing and executing sexual misconduct proceedings.171
However, the 2018 regulations seek to restrict much of the flexibility given to universities
in designing their disciplinary proceedings, specifically, by requiring live cross-examination by
parties or their representatives.172 However, the requirement of live cross-examination conflicts
with federal law and in particular, the Court’s decision in Goss.173 In order to further understand
why live cross-examination by parties or their representatives is not constitutionally necessary in
university disciplinary proceedings, it is helpful to explore post-Goss jurisprudence related to
student procedural due process rights. A month after the Goss decision, the Court focused on
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substantive due process in the context of a student’s civil rights claim. 174 The Court held that school
officials are “entitled to qualified good faith immunity from liability for money damages…unless
they knew or reasonably should have known that their actions would violate the constitutional
rights of the affected student.”175 The Court articulated that it was not the role of the federal
government to set aside decisions of school administrators, even if the court viewed those decisions
as “lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”176 The Court clarified that students (in this case
public high school students) do have procedural and substantive rights while at school, but these
rights are limited.177 The Court’s decision in Goss and Woods demonstrate the Court’s deference
to school officials in creating fair policies and procedures for disciplinary matters.
In Haidak, the court held that university sexual misconduct proceedings must include a
hearing where witnesses are cross-examined, but that such cross-examination could be executed
by a panel or hearing board.178 These procedural requirements are constitutionally sufficient,
aligned with Goss and post-Goss jurisprudence, and provide the opportunity for a “back and forth”
demanded by advocates of student due process rights. Both the court in Baum and the 2018
regulations require cross-examination to be conducted by parties or their representatives,179 and
many advocates of student due process rights reason that such a categorical rule is necessary
because anything less is unconstitutional.180 However, this assertion is false and distracts from
decades of constitutional precedent. In her article, “Misrepresenting Well-Settled Jurisprudence:
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Peddling ‘Due Process’ Clause Fallacies to Justify Gutting Title IX Protections for Girls and
Women,” Penny Venetis notes that the 2018 regulations give the Baum decision “great authority”
and in doing so, the DOE has “abdicated its duties...towards students who have been sexually
assaulted and harassed, in favor of students who have been accused of sexual abuse.”181 Venetis
explains that providing the accused with cross-examination tools that courts have “summarily
rejected for decades” irresponsibly departs from “well-settled case law.”182
The procedural requirements for cross-examination outlined in Haidak better balance the
constitutional flexibility universities have historically held in structuring sexual misconduct
hearings and the need for some type of cross-examination in such hearings. Therefore, the court in
Haidak presents a useful model for universities as they facilitate questioning procedures in sexual
misconduct proceedings.
B. The Haidak Decision Offers a Solution to the Administrative Burden of Modeling University
Adjudication Procedures after Common Law Trials
Under various revisions of Title IX regulations, in cases of sexual misconduct, universities
were required to provide students with notice and “some type of” hearing, but such procedures did
not need to follow the procedural due process requirements of common law trials. 183 However, as
accused students increasingly brought suits alleging violations of their due process rights, courts
were forced to evaluate whether Title IX regulations adequately ensured that university sexual
misconduct proceedings protected student due process rights. 184 The 2018 regulations and the
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Sixth Circuit’s decision in Baum have reinvigorated this controversy, forcing courts and
universities to grapple with whether university disciplinary proceedings must offer the same due
process rights granted in common law trials, specifically, live cross-examination by a party or a
party’s representative—a change that would require many universities to overhaul their
disciplinary proceedings. Here, the First Circuit’s decision in Haidak offers a workable solution
that acknowledges a student’s right to be heard, but also considers the administrative burden many
universities would face if following the 2018 regulations and the Baum decision.
First, modeling university due process procedures, specifically cross-examination
procedures, after common law trials could lead to a host of issues, from administrative efficiency
to student safety.185 If a university proceeding were to be modeled after a criminal or civil model,
the university would face obstacles in its primary goal of ensuring that students’ education is
prioritized by effectively and efficiently responding to student sexual misconduct allegations.186
Mandatory adversarial processes “superimpose a high conflict procedure onto a non-adversarial
community and system.”187
In the Goss decision, the Court recognized the administrative burden schools might face if
required to implement formal due process procedures, such as live cross-examination.188 The Court
articulated that “even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative
facilities.”189 The Court explained that facilitating procedures such as live cross-examination with
counsel would inevitably lead schools to divert resources and increase expenses without
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necessarily improving the effectiveness of the disciplinary proceeding.190 While permitting a party
or a party’s representative to engage in cross-examination might appear to relieve a university or
school of its responsibility to adjudicate a disciplinary matter, such changes would “fundamentally
change the system and render it less accessible to students.” 191 First, adding counsel to represent a
student and facilitate cross-examination would complicate proceedings by “importing outside legal
rules based on adversarial systems.”192 Students (as under the 2018 regulations students may
facilitate cross-examination) and educational institutions would need to learn these “outside legal
rules,” which would require significant training and consultation. 193

In addition, cross-

examination often prolongs hearings and consequently, adds administrative costs.194 Further,
cross-examination frequently “devolves into a mini-trail of extrinsic evidence and character
witnesses because of the impeachment threat that accompanies cross-examination.”195
Thus, in the university setting, it is the university’s responsibility rather than the parties’ to
investigate the facts.196

This system of adjudication and cross-examination is labeled

“inquisitorial” and does not involve the administrative demands of an adversarial model.197 Under
the First Circuit’s holding in Haidak, an inquisitorial model would require universities to facilitate
a “back and forth” form of questioning that is “reasonably calculated” to uncover the truth. 198
Additionally, neither students nor student representatives would be permitted to engage in
questioning or cross-examination, reducing the likelihood of contentious and potentially damaging
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hearings. 199 The First Circuit’s articulation of an inquisitorial model, when designed and executed
effectively, is more conducive to the university setting than cross-examination procedures modeled
after common law trials.
As evidenced by many student lawsuits and general concern about student due process
rights, however, the inquisitorial model used by many universities should be adapted to ensure that
both the accused and accuser in sexual misconduct cases have a chance to present their case and
respond to allegations.200 The First Circuit’s holding in Haidak offers important insight into this
issue. The First Circuit’s decision, through its holding regarding cross-examination procedures,
seems to fairly balance the right of an accused student to be heard, but also the university’s interest
in regulating itself and ensuring that sexual misconduct is handled effectively.
While the First Circuit provides universities with flexibility in designing questioning
procedures, it does require such questioning to meet a standard of “reasonably adequate
questioning.”201 Clarification is needed over what “reasonably adequate” questioning looks like
so that universities can properly protect victims from re-traumatization while also ensuring an
accused student is heard. The First Circuit’s lack of clarity could lead to inconsistent procedures
and continuing litigation and controversy.

Thus, using aspects of the opinion, courts,

policymakers, and universities should outline what “reasonably adequate questioning” looks like.
The First Circuit found that the university conducted “reasonably adequate questioning”
because both parties were permitted to submit questions to the hearing panel and the hearing panel
questioned both Gibney and Haidak multiple times. 202 Therefore, it seems that questioning
procedures should provide students with input and ensure that students respond to questions
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multiple times. Particularly, the First Circuit found that witnesses should be asked the same
question multiple times to determine if a witness’s response is consistent. 203 University
administrators or factfinders should also ask follow-up questions as appropriate and provide the
accused with multiple opportunities to respond to a complainant’s responses. 204 Ideally, the 2018
regulations would adopt the First Circuit’s holding, as it acknowledges that while students are not
constitutionally entitled to a live hearing, there is a need to reform what due process looks like at
the university level in sexual misconduct matters. However, the regulations should further clarify
factors that contribute to “reasonably adequate questioning.”
The First Circuit’s holding in Haidak provides schools with a degree of autonomy on how
hearings are structured, as well as who at the university facilitates the proceeding. 205 The Sixth
Circuit’s categorical rule that demands cross-examination by an accused or the accused’s
representative is indicative of procedural requirements that create a trial-like proceeding that may
burden university administrations, especially universities with less resources.206 The decision in
Haidak will not eliminate university concerns around resources and training, but it will provide
schools the opportunity to revamp current structures instead of overhauling them.
C. The Haidak Decision Considers the Re-traumatization of Victims
The First Circuit decision also accounts for the trauma that victims may experience if
subjected to questioning by their attacker, or highly adversarial questioning in general. Critics of
the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Baum and the 2018 regulations argue that victims will be “retraumatized” and less likely to report sexual misconduct if subjected to the “trial-like” procedures
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outlined in Baum and by the DOE.207 Therefore, the First Circuit’s opinion leaves flexibility in
structuring hearings so that universities can ensure victims are protected and encouraged to report
sexual misconduct when it occurs.
First, the decision in Baum and the 2018 regulations seek to shift the focus of Title IX from
ensuring victims have rights to an education free from sexual harassment to protections for accused
students.208 This departure will likely exacerbate the underreporting of sexual harassment and
abuse that is already rampant within the university setting.209 The National Sexual Violence
Resource Center reports that about 90% of sexual assault victims on college campuses do not
report their assaults.210 If students fear confrontation from their harasser or their harasser’s
representative, they will be less likely to report, especially if they feel they will not be believed.
Student victims are less likely to report sexual assaults if such reporting leads to a courtroom-like
proceeding, and “some evidence suggests that fear of cross-examination may be the primary
driving force behind underreporting in the criminal justice system.” 211 The 2018 regulations create
obstacles for students reporting sexual abuse and such obstacles are contrary to the intent of Title
IX.
Essentially, adversarial cross-examination is inappropriate in the university setting.
University proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and while adversarial cross-examination
has benefits, it is likely to contribute to underreporting of sexual assault at universities and the
re-traumatization of student victims. Cross-examination questioning does not always seek to
advance truth-seeking, but rather, functions as a means to intimidate or discredit a victim. 212

207

Id.
Venetis, supra note 155.
209 Id.
210 Get Statistics, NAT ’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE R ESOURCE C TR., https://www.nsvrc.org/statistics (last visiting March
10, 2020).
211 Bruton, supra note 194.
212 Id.
208

31

Further, strategic cross-examiners can ask questions about impermissible topics or “make the
same insinuations through permissible questioning.”213 For example, in a cross-examination of a
rape victim, an advocate will address questions of consent and “grill the victim about the details
of her behavior, attitudes and attire on the night of the attack...The lawyer must characterize
every detail vividly from the most salacious point of view attainable and present it all with
maximum innuendo.”214
Adversarial and aggressive cross-examination harms a victim. Many victims of sexual
harassment and assault are severely traumatized by the crime and must undergo that trauma
again in court. Moreover, many advocates seek to exculpate the accused by addressing
“factfinders’ preexisting beliefs and stereotypes about what ‘real’ assault looks like.”215 Victims
may be asked questions such as, “Did you resist?” or “Why didn’t you go to the police right
after?” Such questions “reinforce oppressive social norms and leave many victims feeling
partially responsible for the harm done to them.”216 If student victims fear trial-like procedures
and fail to report instances of sexual misconduct, sexual harassment persists and universities not
only fail to deter instances of sexual harassment but fail to protect student victims. The
questioning procedures outlined by the First Circuit in Haidak provide the accused student with a
chance to participate in questioning, but also ensure student complainants are protected.
The inquisitorial model articulated by the First Circuit in Haidak decreases the trauma a
complainant experiences while testifying as a neutral panel ensures questioning is not abusive. In
a courtroom setting, even the “most attentive arbiters cannot censor all abusive questions, so by
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allowing a panel to censor or change questions” the inquisitorial model ensures abusive and
adversarial questioning is precluded.217 A neutral party can also control the length of the
proceeding and prevent victims from “excessively long proceedings.” 218
Universities should develop a mechanism for cross-examination, but this should not
involve the accused or his or her representative because a neutral third-party is constitutionally
adequate, provides universities with needed flexibility, and decreases the potential for a victim to
experience additional emotional trauma.
V. Conclusion
Despite current Title IX regulations, litigation continues to arise over due process rights in
sexual misconduct cases at the university level. Consequently, the First Circuit’s decision in
Haidak should be leveraged to guide policymakers and universities in developing fair processes
that protect an accused’s due process rights, but also do not overburden university administrations,
and more importantly, do not re-traumatize victims or discourage victims from seeking redress.
Haidak should guide legal advisors and policymakers as they continue to advise
universities on best practices to ensure due process is satisfied and campus sexual misconduct is
handled effectively. As Title IX regulations continue to be revised, the Haidak opinion should
maintain relevancy in conversations surrounding how sexual misconduct is handled at the
university level.

217
218

Bruton, supra note 194.
Id.

33

